Amid growing Israeli anxiety over the shape of a potential US-Iran agreement, President Donald Trump placed a phone call to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that, according to a senior Israeli official cited by the Times of Israel, contained a specific and significant reassurance: the United States will not sign any final agreement with Iran that does not require the complete dismantlement of Tehran’s nuclear program and the physical removal of all enriched uranium from Iranian territory.
The Times of Israel reported the call on May 24, 2026, at a moment when the contours of an initial US-Iran deal were coming into focus, and what that deal contained, or notably did not contain, had set off alarm bells in Jerusalem.
The Deal Taking Shape: What Israel Can See
The initial agreement that has been emerging from US-Iran negotiations is structured in two phases. The first phase centers on practical near-term steps: a 60-day extension of the existing ceasefire and, crucially, the reopening of the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping. That second element has enormous financial implications for global oil markets and for the economies of every country that relies on Gulf energy transit.
What the initial deal does not include is any requirement for Iran to export its stockpile of highly enriched uranium. The nuclear question, including what happens to the estimated hundreds of kilograms of uranium enriched to near-weapons-grade levels, is being deferred to the second phase of negotiations during the 60-day window.
For Israel, that deferral is not a minor procedural detail. It is, from Jerusalem’s vantage point, the central issue. Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and enriched uranium stockpile represent an existential threat in a way that no other element of the conflict does. An agreement that pauses the fighting and reopens the Strait while leaving that stockpile intact and in Iranian hands is, to Israeli strategic thinkers, not a step toward security. It is a pause that creates breathing room for Iran to preserve the core of what Israel has spent years trying to eliminate.
Netanyahu’s Position and His Leverage Problem
Netanyahu has reportedly been largely frozen out of the US-Iran negotiations, a situation that reflects both the dynamics of the Trump-Netanyahu relationship at this stage of the conflict and the broader US preference for conducting the talks bilaterally with Tehran rather than through a multilateral framework that would give Israel formal standing at the table.
Israel’s leverage in this situation is real but limited. The IDF has demonstrated extraordinary capability against Iranian targets over the course of the conflict, degrading Iranian air defenses, striking facilities associated with the nuclear program, and conducting operations that have significantly reduced Iran’s capacity to project force. That battlefield record gives Israel credibility. It does not give Israel the ability to veto an agreement negotiated between Washington and Tehran.
Trump’s call to Netanyahu, if accurately described by the Israeli official, was an attempt to address the political pressure Netanyahu is under domestically. Israeli public opinion has largely supported aggressive action against Iran’s nuclear program. A deal that leaves that program intact, even temporarily, would be politically costly for Netanyahu and potentially destabilizing for his coalition. Trump appears to understand that dynamic and is offering Netanyahu a private assurance designed to hold the relationship together while the initial phase of the deal moves forward.
Why the Nuclear Condition Is the Sticking Point
The gap between the US position, as privately articulated to Netanyahu, and the initial deal structure points to a fundamental tension in the negotiations. Iran has consistently treated its enriched uranium stockpile as a core strategic asset, not a bargaining chip to be surrendered in the opening phase of talks. Tehran’s position has been that nuclear-related discussions require a comprehensive settlement that addresses its security concerns, sanctions relief, and the broader regional order.
Washington’s phased approach reflects a pragmatic reading of what Iran will actually agree to in the short term. Getting the Strait of Hormuz reopened has immediate, enormous economic value: it relieves pressure on global oil prices, reduces inflationary risk in major economies, and removes a daily flashpoint that could escalate the conflict unpredictably. Those are not trivial gains, and the Trump administration has calculated that securing them now, even at the cost of deferring the nuclear question, is worth the political friction with Israel.
The risk in that calculation is precisely what Israel is identifying. Sixty days is enough time for Iran to take steps to protect its nuclear program, move assets, or negotiate in bad faith before talks on the harder issues begin. Israel has seen this pattern before, in the lead-up to the JCPOA under Obama and in subsequent negotiations, and the Israeli strategic community is deeply skeptical that deferral is actually a pathway to resolution rather than a pathway to a worse negotiating position.
For analysis of how Israeli officials have previously assessed nuclear deal frameworks, see Iran Deal Trump Can Get Is No Better Than Obama’s JCPOA, Israeli Analysts Warn.
The Uranium Stockpile Question: Why It Cannot Be Deferred Indefinitely
The insistence on full removal of enriched uranium is not arbitrary. Iran is currently estimated to hold enriched uranium at levels of 60 percent and higher, which is well beyond what any civilian nuclear power program requires and close enough to weapons-grade material that the breakout timeline to a functional nuclear device is measured in weeks rather than months. The specific quantity, the enrichment level, and the dispersal of that material across Iranian facilities are variables that intelligence services track with intense focus precisely because they define the breakout window.
Israel’s position has long been that allowing Iran to maintain a large stockpile of near-weapons-grade uranium while conducting negotiations is equivalent to negotiating while your counterpart holds a loaded weapon. The stockpile does not need to be assembled into a device to function as leverage. Its mere existence constrains the options of every other party in the negotiation.
Trump’s private assurance to Netanyahu on this point, that any final deal will require removal of all enriched uranium from Iranian territory, represents a significant red line if it holds. The question is how that red line will be enforced in a second-phase negotiation that will inevitably face pressure from Iran to soften or delay compliance. Iranian negotiators are experienced at identifying leverage points and testing the durability of stated red lines.
The IDF’s Role in Creating the Conditions for This Negotiation
It is worth noting that the negotiating dynamic that currently exists, in which Iran is prepared to discuss reopening the Strait and extending a ceasefire, exists because of what the IDF and US military forces have done over the course of the conflict. The degradation of Iranian air defenses, the pressure on Iranian energy infrastructure, and the demonstrated willingness to escalate have created the conditions under which Tehran calculates that a deal is preferable to continued conflict.
The IDF Chief Zamir’s publicly stated readiness to execute a broad operation against Iran’s target list has not disappeared because negotiations are underway. That capability remains, and Tehran’s negotiators are aware of it. The military pressure is, in effect, an implicit part of every conversation, and it is one of the reasons the deal being discussed is as favorable to Western interests as it is.
For more on the IDF’s strategic posture toward Iran, see IDF Chief Zamir: Iran Operation Ready.
Financial Markets and the Hormuz Variable
The financial stakes attached to the Strait of Hormuz provision in the initial deal are substantial. Approximately 20 percent of global oil and LNG trade transits the Strait, and the disruption to that flow since the conflict began has been a persistent driver of energy price volatility. Central banks monitoring inflation have been tracking Hormuz as a key external variable in their rate decisions.
A durable reopening of the Strait, even for 60 days, would provide meaningful relief to energy markets and reduce one of the primary upward pressures on oil prices that have been weighing on global growth projections. The economic case for the initial deal is therefore strong from a purely financial perspective, which explains why the Trump administration is prepared to accept the political friction with Israel in order to secure it.
The complication is that a 60-day reopening followed by a failed second phase, in which Iran refuses to move on the nuclear question, would leave the situation worse than before. Markets that have adjusted to a post-deal environment would face a second shock. Israel, which accepted the initial deal under Trump’s assurances, would be in a politically difficult position. And Iran, which will have used the 60 days to regroup, would re-enter the conflict from a stronger position.
Trump’s assurance to Netanyahu is therefore not simply a diplomatic courtesy. It is a statement about what the second phase of negotiations must deliver if the overall diplomatic framework is to be sustainable. Whether those assurances hold under the pressure of actual negotiations with Tehran remains the central question in one of the most consequential diplomatic exercises of the current era.
