A team appointed by the Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi, received the final report on the incident that took place on May 31st, 2010. The report was widely distributed throughout the IDF with the core of the report presented to the Minister of Defense of Israel as well. Written to answer general questions about chosen course of action and other possible alternatives, advance preparations, and the operation’s implementation the team included eight officers.
The team concluded that not all possible intelligence gathering methods were fully implemented and that the coordination between Navy Intelligence and Israel Defense Intelligence was insufficient but added that the anticipated level of violence used against the forces was underestimated while capping off the report by emphasizing that it is not certain that an optimal intelligence effort would create a complete intelligence picture. Additionally the team determined that the operation relied excessively on a single course of action, albeit a probable one, while no alternative courses of action were prepared for the event of more dangerous scenarios.
Additionally the team analyzed and reported on other areas of the operation including technological alternatives, media relations, operation command, professionalism, and medical evacuations.
Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland praised everyone involved with the report from the transparency of those interviewed to the candid and objective view of those composing the report. Additionally he said that a there’s a tendency to draw general conclusions based on a single incident and that “the fact that the IDF examines itself and others do not, results in that only the errors of the IDF are publicized,” according to Maj. Gen. (Res.) Eiland.